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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
COUNTY OF SULLIVAN 
····--.-· -······-------······-··-----·-·· ········· ·····-·····--·. -· ······ x 
In the matter 9f the Application of 
IAN ECKARDT-RIGBERG, 13 A 1560, 
Petitioner, 
-against· 
TINA M. STANFORD, CHAIR OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE, 
Respondent. 
- ----·-···----------------------------······- ---------------x 
APPEARANCES: 
DECISION and ORDER 
Index No. 1638-16 
Rn No. 52-38569 2016 
Kathy Manley, Esq., 74 Chapel Street, Albany, NY 12207, Attorney for Petitioner 
Attorney General of the. State of New York, One Civic Center 'Plaza- Suite 401, Poughkeepsie, 
NY 12601, By: Heather R. Rubenstein, AAG, of counsel, Attorney for Respondent 
Schick, J. 
This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner's Article 78 Petition requesting a de 
novo parole hearing. Respondent submitted and affirmation in qpposition. Petitioner submitted a 
Reply. The parties appeared for oral argument on January 5, 2017. 
Factual Back2round 
Petitioner was convicted, by guilty plea, of Manslaughter in the Second Degree and 
operating a Motor Vehicle-Leaving the Scene of an Accident. Albany County Court (Hon. 
Thomas A. Breslin) sentenced Petitioner to an indeterminate term of three and a third to I 0 years 
in state prison for the manslaughter conviction, to ·run concurrently with an indetenninate tenn of 
two tQ six years in state prison for the leaving the scene of an accident conviction. The instant 
offenses involved Petitioner driving at a high rate of speed through a red traffic light while being 
pursued by the police. He struck a pedestrian; killing him, and fled the scene of the accident. 
Petitioner iriitially took flight from the police when they attempted to pull him over for speeding; 
his driver's license had been suspended for previous speeding violations. 
Petitioner is currently housed at Sullivan Correctional Facility. He has been diagnosed 
with .Asperger' s Syndrome and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). While in state 
custody, Petitioner has had no dis'ciplinary infractions, has completed all required programming 
(a~ of the date of his parole interview), has taken additional programming and co11ege 
educational classes, and has an Earned Eligibility 9ertificate. Petitioner has no criminal history 
prior to the instant offenses. 
The record before the Court indicates Petitioner has assurances of employment upon his 
release, and that he will live with his parents and extended family in Delmar, New York. He 
submitted a very detailed and specific plan to the p~ole board should he be released to 
superv1s10n. 
Petitioner appeared for his initial parole interview on March 8, 2016, at Sullivan 
Correctional Facility. 'The board denied parole release and imposed a 2~-month hold. Petitioner 
timely perfected an administrative appeal on July 12, 2016. The Appeals Unit affirmed the 
board's denial of parole by decision daterl August 8, 2016. 
Petitioner timely filed the within Article 78 petition, raising the following issues: (1) that 
the board relied solely on the instant offenses in making its decision; (2) the board ignored his 
youthful age when he committed tlie instant offenses; (3) the Patole Board Report had errors; (4) 
the board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments; (5) the regulations violate the separation 
of powers provision of the constitution; (6) the board failed to provide detail or substantial 
evidence; and (7) the board's decision was predetemiined. 
For the reasons indicated below, this Court grants Petitioner's request for a de novo 
parole interview. 
Parole Law 
Executive Law, Section 259-i(2)(c)(A) states in pertinent part: 
In µlaking the parole release decision, the guidelines adopted pursuant to 
subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article sbaJ I require 
_that the following be considered: (i) the institutional record including program 
goals and accomplisl1ments, academic achievements, vocational education, 
training or work assignments, therapy and interpersonal relationships with staff 
and inmates; (ii) performance, if any, aS'·a participant in a temporary release 
program; (iii) release plans including community resources, employment, 
education and trai ning and support services available to the inmate .... 
The parole board must also consider whether "there is a reasonable probability that, if such 
irunate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release 
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his 
crime as to undennine respect for the Jaw." 9 NYCRR 8002.1. 
In reaching its decision, the board must also consider: 
(!!) the inmate's institutional reco.rd; 
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(b) the inmate's release plans; 
(c) any statement made to the board by the victim's representative; 
( d) the seriousness of the offense, with consideration of the sentence and the 
recommendation of the sentencing court; and 
(e) the inmate's prior criminal record. ' 
Regarding an earned eligibility certificate (~EC), 9 NYCRR, Section 8002.l(b) states, 
Earned eligibility. Inma~es statutorily eligible to receive a certificate of earned 
eligibility pursuant to section 805 of the Correction Law, and who have been 
issued such certificates by the Commissioner of Correctional Services, shall be 
granted parole release at the expiration of their 1l1inimum terms or as authorized 
by subdivision 4 of section 867 of the Correction Law, unless the Board of Parole 
detennines that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he 
will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that release is not 
compatible with the "welfare of society. 
Furthennore, when a parole board reviews release for an inmate with an EEC, pursuant to 9 
NYCRR §8002.3(c); it must comply with the following: · 
In those cases where a certificate of earned eligibility has been issuCd, the board 
shall consi~er the following in making the parole release decision: 
( l) the guideline time-range matrix; 
(2) the institutional disciplinary record; 
(3) performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release program; 
(4) release plans, including community resources, employment, education and 
training, and support services available to the inmate; and 
(5) any available infonnation which would indicate an inability to live and remain 
at liberty without violating the law, and that the release is incompatible. with the 
welfare of society. 
When denying release to an inmate with an EEC, a parole board must articulate a 
rationale to support a decision that if released the inmate would not remain at liberty without 
violating the law and that release would not be compatible with the welfare of society; simply 
regurgitating the language of the statute is not' enough to overcome the burden· of the presumption 
that the inmate should be released. Schwartz v. Dennison, 14 Misc.3d 1220(A), 1227(A) [S. Ct. 
New York Co! 2Q06). Discussion and questioning of the statutory factors, if not supported by the 
evidence in the record, is merely perfunctory and grounds for reversal and a de novo hearing. Id. 
at 1228(A); Ob.eroi v. Dennison, 19 Misc.3d 1106(A) [S. Ct Franklin Co. 2008). 
Parole Boards have very wide discretion to grant or deny parole release; the board decides 
how much weight to give each of the factors listed above. Pliillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d (1'1 
Dept. 2007). It is also not necessary that the board expressly discuss each of the factors or any 
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guidelines in its determination. W11lker v. Tra'l'is, 252 A.D.2d 360 (Yd Dept. 1998) . An inmate 
bears the heavy burden of establishing that the detennination of a parole board was the result of 
"irrationality bordering on impropriety." Matte,. of Silmo1t v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470 [2000J; 
Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69 [1980] . Nonetheless, the reasons for 
denying parole must "be given in detail and not in conclusory lerms." Executive Law, Section 
259-i(2)(a); Wallman v. Travis, 18 A.D.3d 304 [111 Dept. 2005]; Molo11e v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 
71912nc1 Dept. 2011]. 
The standard ofreview in regard to parole release is whether the decision was so 
irrational as to border on impropriety. Maller oj'Russo v. New York St<tte Board of Parole, 50 
NY2d 69 [1980]; Epps v Trat•is, 241 AD2d 738 [3rd Dept. 1997]; Matter of Sllmo11 v. Travis, 
95 NY2d 470 (2000]. When considering tbe various factors, the weight accorded to any 
particular factor is solely within a parole board's discretion. Matter of Sa11tos v. Evans, 81 AD3d 
1059 (3" Dept. 2011]; Matter of Wise v. New York State Divisio,, of Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3rd 
Dept. 2008]. fncluded in such factors are the seriousness of the instant offense(s) and an inmate's 
criminal history. Executive Law §259-i(2)(A). · ' 
lo 2011, the legislature made changes to Executive Law, §259. The changes to 
Executive Law, §259-c(4) became effective on October I, 2011. In essence, those modifications 
now require tl1at parole boards (I) consider the seriousness of the underlying crime in 
conjunction with the other factors enumerated in the statute, Executive Law, §259-i(2), and (2) 
conduct a risk assessment analysis to determine if an inmate has been rehab ii itated and is ready 
for release. Executive Law, §259-(c)(4). The changes were intended to shift th~ focus of parole 
boards to a forward-thinking paradigm, rather than a backward looking approach to evaluating 
whether an inmate is rehabilitated and ready for release. 
Discussion 
While a parole board enjoys a significant level of'discretion, the discretion is not 
unlimited. T here ai:e three things a parole board cannot do. First, a parole board cannot base its 
decision to deny parole release solely on the serious nature of the underlying crime. Rios v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 15 Misc3d 1107(A) lSup. Ct. Kings Co. 2007); see also, King"· 
New Yori< State Division of Parole, 190 AD2d 423 [1" Dept. 1993). Second, while the board 
need not consider each factor separately, and has broad discretion to consider the importance of 
each factor, the board must still consider all of the .factors and guidelines. Executive Law §259-
i(2)(a); Ri.os, supra. Third, the reasons for denying parole must be given in detail and not 
conclusory terms. Executive Law §259-i(2)(a); Wallman v. Travis. 18 AD3d 304 [1'1 Dept. 
2005). 
f\,fter a thorough review of the record before this Co'W't, including the confidential 
materials for in camera review and the issl1es raised during oral argument, this Cot11i has 
determined the board based its decision to deny parole release to Petitioner solely on the nature 
of the instant offense and tragic consequences, did not consider all of the guidelines or factors, 
-4-
failed to consider the EEC (despite mentioning it in passing), and the decision was in conclusory 
tenns. The Court is unable to detennine on what legttimate grou1Jds the board denied release. 
The only language in the decision that provides any insight into the board's decision is the 
board's unsupported conclusion that because Petitioner did not seek assistance for the victim and 
drove off, he showed "rio regard for that human life," and therefore, years later, he is somehow 
unrehabilitated and a safety risk to the public. Considering all of the other required factors, i.e., 
the EEC, programming, plans for release, completely clean disciplinary history while 
incarcerated, family and professional support, and other factors, the denial of pnrole release was 
arbitrar)' and capricious and unsupported by the record. Petitioner cannot change what happened, 
or his decision to leave the scene of the accident. What he could do, and what he did do, was 
maintain a clean disciplinary history while incarcerated, take all programs available to and 
required of him, take additional education programs ort the college level, learn skills, show 
remorse and accept r~sponsibility for his criminal behavior, and do everything required by 
DOCCS and the statute to rehabilitate himself and ready himself for parole release. 
. There is no additional rationale, other than the board's opinion of the tragic consequence 
of Petitioner's criminal behavior, to justify ~enial of parole release. Petitioner bas had a pe1fect 
discipljnary record while incarcerated; has completed required DOCCS programs; has 
demonstrated remorse and responsibility for the crimes; and he has a substantial support system 
on the outsiqe, release plans, and housing and employment ready upon his release. The written 
decision does no more than recite the statutory language upon which a board may deny release to . . 
parole, but does little more to explain, in sufficient detail, how the board came to such 
conclusions, other than its unfounded conclusion that Petitioner is unfit for release because years 
ago, when he committed the instant offenses, he did not seek help for the victim. Petitioner's 
EEC, which creates a presumption of release, required that the board to articulate actual reasons 
to support its conclusion that Petitioner "would not live at liberty without again violating the ·Jaw 
and furthermore [his] release would be incompatible with the welfare of society." Sc!rwartz v. 
Dennison, supra. There is nothing in the recbrd to support that conclusion. µpon which it based 
its denial of parole release; in fact, the record contradicts the board's concJusion. 
In addition, this court finds that the parole board could not have seriously considered the 
factors required under 9 NYCQ.R §800Z:3(c) regarding the EEC. Petitioner has a clean 
disciplinary history. Petitioner has a family nnd definite release plans. He has no criminal history. 
There is nothing in the record, overal l or specifically, to indicate Petitioner wi.ll not be a Jaw 
abiding citizen if relea.sed to parole supervision or that his release is incompatible with the 
welfare of society. 9 NYCRR §8002;3(c)(5). Therefore, it is this Court's opinion that the parole 
board's decision is unsupported by the objective record before it. The lack of specificity and 
reasoning in the parole board's written decision, as well as the record before it, failed to 
overcome the presumption of release in this case. Schwartz v. Dennison, 14 Misc.3d 1220(A), 
1227(A) [S. Ct. New York Co. 200_6] . 
The reasoning and analysis required by the statute and the rules is simply not }n the 
decision and there is no evidence in the record to shed light on which specific facts the board 
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might have relied in denying parole release to Petitioner, who has an EEC. Oberoi v. Demiisvn, 
sllpra. While the Court recognizes the wide latitude and discretion afforded to parole boards, 
Piii/lips v. Dennison, supra,, it also recognizes parole board decisions may be vacateAI when they 
are arbitrary and capricious and so unsuppo11ed by the law as to be irrational and bordering on 
impropriety. Oberoi v. Demrison, sttpra; Matter of Russo v. New York State Boa1'd of Parole, 
supra. In the case at bar, the parole board failed to meet its burden under~ NYCRR §8002.l(b) 
and 9 NYCRR §8002.3(c). 
This Cowt finds that the Parole Board failed to follow its obligations under Executive 
Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) and Corrections Law §805. The parole board failed to articulate any basis 
upon why it denied release. Executive Lnw §2!59-i(2)(c)(A). It is unacceptable,. under the law, 
for Respondents to have simply restated th~ statutory language, with no specificity or other 
explanation to justify parole denial. While this Court recognizes the substantial discretion 
afforded to parole boards by statutory authority, that authority and parole board decisions are 
reviewable by courts and must stand up to the other statutory requirements regarding parole 
release procedures. 
In the instant matter, the Court finds that the board has failed to meet those s~andards by 
rendering a conclusory decision, and rendered a decision completely unsupported by the record 
and Petitioner's history of incarceration. 
Based on the foregoing, it is therefore 
ORDERED, that the Petition is granted to the extent.that the Parole Board shaJI afford 
the petitioner herein a de nova Parole hearing within SIXTY (60) days of the date of entry of this 
order, and a decision thereon not more than fifteen (15) days thereafter; and it is further 
ORDERED, that the de novo hearing herein shall consist of at least two Parole Board 
members, none of whom sat on ~he prior parole hearing involving the above captioned inmate. 
This shall constitute the Decision and Order of this Court. 
DATED: January 6, 2017. 
Monticello, New York 
Papers considered: 
Notice of Petition, by Kathy Manley, Esq., dated September, 2016 
Petition with Exhibits, by Kathy Manley, Esq., dated September, 2016 
Answer and Return with Exhibits, by Heather R. Rubenstein, AAG, dated November 8, 2016 
Do<:urnents for in camera ~view 
Reply Affim1atio~IMemorandurn of Law, by Kathy Manley, Esq., dated November 2l,2016 
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